DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 205 966 CS 206 447

AUTHOR Wedel, Janine
TITLE Opposition in East European Countries: The Language of Protest and Uses of the Press as a Medium of Protest in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
PUB DATE Aug 81
NOTE 48p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism (64th, East Lansing, MI, August 8-11, 1981).

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Activism; Comparative Analysis; *Content Analysis; Foreign Countries; Journalism; *Language Usage; *News Media; Political Issues; *Press Opinion
IDENTIFIERS Czechoslovakia; *Europe (East); Hungary; Poland; *Underground Press

ABSTRACT

Contending that an examination of the commentary and text of the media can reveal the composition, assumptions, and goals of political opposition movements, this paper analyzes the role of the press and its language of protest in Poland's current political context. The first section of the paper examines the responses of both the official and the unofficial press media to the unrest of 1976 and 1980. In addition, it discusses the reasons for the creation of the unofficial press and comments on Poland's political future. The second and third sections of the paper compare the responses of the press in Poland to those of the press in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia during similar episodes. The final section draws conclusions about protest and the uses of the press during periods of opposition and unrest in the three countries. (FL)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

ED205966

OPPOSITION IN EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The Language of Protest and Uses of the Press as a Medium of Protest in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Janine Wedel
Department of Anthropology
University of California, Berkeley

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Janine Wedel

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

To Be Presented at the
Association for Education in Journalism Conference
East Lansing, Michigan
August 11, 1981

CS206447

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 1

POLAND 2
Introduction 2
The Official vs. the Unofficial Press: Why an Underground Press? 3
The Reaction of the Unofficial Press to the Unrest of 1976 and 1980 5
The Reaction of the Official Media to the Events of 1976 and 1980 9
Implications for the Future 15

HUNGARY 20
Introduction 20
Journalism Before and During the Revolt 21
Journalism After Soviet Intervention 24
Conclusion 25

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 27
Introduction 27
Journalism Before and During the Liberalization . . . 28
Journalism After Soviet Intervention 30
Conclusion 32

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 34

BIBLIOGRAPHY 38
Primary 38
Secondary 44

ABSTRACT

This paper will focus on the language of protest and the role of the press in the Polish political context. Although the commentary and text of the media are not direct expressions of attitudes and understandings, they shed light on the composition, assumptions, and goals of opposition movements and governments. This paper pays particular attention to the themes of protest and the use of the media to further the goals of the opposition. It examines the responses of the Polish official and unofficial media to the unrest of 1976 and 1980, and compares them with the political language utilized during similar episodes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Finally, it draws conclusions about protest and the uses of the press through periods of opposition and unrest in these countries.

POLAND

Introduction

The recent and ongoing unrest in Poland has brought to light the complicated role of the Polish media during the last five years. Since the unrest of 1976, there have been two presses in Poland, an official and an unofficial press, which have fulfilled key political functions. The official press reflected the changeable composition, position, and policies of the Polish leadership, whereas the unofficial press served as an arm of the increasing opposition, born of the labor unrest of 1976. Now with the appearance of Solidarnosc, a newspaper which represents the views of Solidarity, for the first time an uncensored opposition paper is being printed with the permission of the government.

Although the events in Poland have been well reported in the Western press, the accounts of events often leave the reader with the impression that the crisis developed overnight. The fact is, however, that the essential ingredients for the crisis have been brewing for many years. The economy has progressively deteriorated; the credibility of the government has steadily decreased; and the dissident movement, fueled by consumer dissatisfaction, has subsequently grown. Preceded by similar episodes in 1956, 1970, and 1976, the actual strikes and demonstrations of July and August 1980 were unleashed by an increase in meat prices. But unlike previous periods of turmoil, in 1980 the government negotiated with organized

workers and the two parties eventually signed an agreement which legalized free trade unions.

The Official vs. the Unofficial Press: Why an Underground Press?

> In the socialist system, the press plays an extremely important role; it shapes the social consciousness and is a culture-building factor.[1]

Two major official daily newspapers which fulfill the "extremely important role" of the press in Poland are Trybuna Ludu (The Peoples' Tribune), the main daily paper of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) Central Committee, and Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw Life), a popular Warsaw morning newspaper. Trybuna Ludu has a circulation of 315,000 and Zycie Warszawy has a circulation of 400,000.[2] Polityka (Politics), a weekly newspaper, and Zycie Partii (Party Life), a monthly paper of the PUWP Central Committee, are also widely circulated papers that cover social and political affairs.

Although de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe created the conditions for some diversification in the official press, Poles read the official papers they buy with a critical eye. Why are Poles skeptical of the offical sources of information? Andrzej Szczypiorski, a leading Polish writer, says:

> Contemporary reality, as supplied by the Polish mass media, is not only truncated but emerges as an astonishing and incoherent magma of falsehoods, half-truths and vague innuendoes--a world of illusion and wishful thinking that bears little resem-

---

[1]Poland: A Handbook, (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1977), p. 489.

[2]Handbuck der Weltpresse, Band 1: Die Pressesysteme der Welt, (Koln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970), p. 438.

resemblance to real life.[3]

Every day Poles are informed through the morning newspaper and evening television that Poland is a land with a thriving economy. Yet, everyday they must stand in long lines to put food on the evening dinner table; hassle the crowds; and frequent store after store in search of a particular staple which perhaps is not to be found anywhere. Poles are well aware that they may have to wait years to obtain an apartment or to get the plumbing fixed, and months to buy a new coat or pair of shoes. There is a deep discrepancy between the environment that Poles experience daily and feel they can realistically expect in their lifetime, and the picture they are presented with by the mass media.[4]

It is in light of the discrepancy between daily experience and realizable expectation on the one hand, and the mass media's portrayal of life on the other, that the publishing activities of the opposition have gained particular momentum in recent years. Opposition groups have organized themselves in order to defend the interests of workers, farmers, students, and intellectuals, and to provide these groups with reliable information. At least twenty samizdat papers are published regularly in Poland. Although their monthly circulation was only about 20,000, in 1978 they were read by as many as 100,000

---

[3]Andrzej Szczypiorski, "Poland--The fiction and the reality," Index on Censorship, 1979, 6, 4.

[4]Index on Censorship, Volume 8, No. 6; Nov.-Dec. 1979, p. 4.

people,[5] a figure which has certainly expanded in recent months.

The Reaction of the Unofficial Press to the Unrest of 1976 and 1980

The alternative press took shape following the labor unrest of 1976. In June 1976, as well as in July 1980, a rise in meat prices triggered strikes and demonstrations throughout Poland. Although the leadership was forced to rescind the price hikes immediately in both cases, in 1976 the government initially arrested hundreds of workers and eventually sentenced some of them. In September 1976 workers formed KOR, an acronyn for Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Committee for the Defense of Workers), in response to the events and aftermath of the June unrest. KOR supplied legal and financial assistance to victimized workers and their families, and began publishing Komunikat (Comminique), a monthly journal which interpreted the June events, described KOR's activities on behalf of the imprisoned workers, and resported on subsequent arrests, detentions, and trials. Biuletyn Informacyjny (Bulletin of Information), another monthly associated with KOR, appeared at about the same time. In 1979, each issue contained about fifty pages, and around 5,000 copies were distributed throughout Poland.[6] The editors of Biuletyn Informacyjny emphasized the presentation of documents and facts and avoided editorial comment.

---

[5]Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," Problems of Communism, 1978, 28 (5), 50.

[6]Index of Censorship, "The Flying University," p.17.

In March 1977, another opposition group, ROPCIO (Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights), began publishing Opinia, the first publication which appealed to a wider non-intellectual audience, as well as the first to openly publish the names and addresses of its contributors. About this time, the struggle between the government and the opposition was at a particularly volatile point. Although fifteen members of KOR were arrested, it was the government that finally released the jailed demonstrators in July 1977.

Robotnik (The Worker), a bi-weekly underground publication, helped to lay the preparatory groundwork for the labor movement's confrontation with the government in the summer of 1980. Founded in September 1977, the expressed goal of Robotnik was to stimulate dialogue between intellectuals, students, religious leaders, and workers. It has the largest circulation of all the underground papers. This is facilitated by the fact that each issue contains only two-four pages.[7] In the summer of 1980, Robotnik doubled its usual circulation of 15,000, and published an information sheet "How to Strike."[8]

A major function of the underground media is to provide links between the oposition elements in all areas of society. Tadeusz Walendowski, former editor of the underground literary quarterly Puls (Pulse),agrees that KOR has, through its numerous publications, "established a network of communication

---

[7]Ibid.

[8]Tadeusz Walendowski, "The Polish Summer of 1980," Columbia Journalism Review, Nov./Dec., p. 33.

between previously isolated groups. From the very beginning, mutual support and communication between intellectuals and workers has been the central aim in these efforts."[9] In the summer of 1980, KOR activists served as principle sources of information, both within and outside of Poland.

> When this summer's wave of strikes began in Poland, KSS "KOR" was uniquely prepared to fill the information gap. It performed its function as a strike information agency from the very first day (July 2), and continued to do so, proving to be a reliable source of accurate and noninflammatory information. On August 8, KOR released a statement expressing its readiness to serve as a contact center for the various strike committees, offering to establish contacts with experts and even to provide some financial support.[10]

This close cooperation between worker and dissident organizations in the exchange of information, has prepared the groundwork for future cooperative efforts.

In contrast to June 1976, in the summer of 1980 the workers' actions (with respect to their demands for more benefits and higher wages) were solidly supported by an organized opposition. According to Walendowski, the opposition press

> clearly played a crucial rule in knitting the movement together, rallying and informing local strike committees about what was going on, and collecting accurate information which, supplied to foreign correspondents and picked up by Western European broadcasters, was instantly fed back to Poland.[11]

---

[9]The New York Times, "The Polish Workers Gain Maturity," Tadeusz Walendowski, August 20, 1980.

[10]Studium, "Danger Ahead? Poland's Crisis Not Over," October 1980, 4(4), 2.

[11]Walendowski, op. cit., p. 35.

In July and August 1980, the opposition press unified the labor movement by gathering information, creating information links, and reporting current events to local strike committees and foreign correspondents.

Although fliers and leaflets had been produced previously, serious publishing in the Lenin Shipyard began around August 20.[12]

> Once it became clear that the strike action had engulfed the whole coast and was spreading in other areas and that the Gdansk action would continue as an occupational strike with the Lenin Shipyard as the center of resistance, the development of an information service became an obvious necessity.[13]

The Gdansk Interfactory Strike Committee began publishing Strajkowy Biuletyn Informacyjny-Solidarnosc (Strike Information Bulletin-Solidarity) on August 23. The dissemination of 14 issues of Solidarnosc (Solidarity), the bulletin produced in the Gdansk shipyard, largely filled the information gap between strike centers throughout Poland.

In addition to reporting on the latest developments in the negotiations, issues of Solidarnosc challenged official statements, provided instructions for strikers, and listed the twenty-one demands presented by the Inter-factory Strike Committee to the government committee.[14] The editors of Solidarnosc were concerned with reacting to the official press. One of the strike bulletins included a formal protest by offi-

---

[12]Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Situation Report, Oct. 20, 1980, p. 21.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

cial journalists covering the strikes against the government's policy of printing only particular information about the strikes. Articles in Solidarnosc did not slander the party or the government, but carried comments such as "the party has lost its authority, and regaining it will be very difficult."[15]

The Reaction of the Official Media to the Events of 1976 and 1980

The official press responded to the riots of June 1976 by towing a more conservative Party line. A stark reaction to the right took place, and liberal tendencies in editorials were abruptly curtailed. In contrast to media coverage in 1976, in 1980, the media did not cover the strikes initially. Several weeks after the outbreak of the first major strikes, they acknowledged the unrest with minimal coverage. Eventually, the official media began to express the differing views of various groups in Poland, and an unprecedented pluralism emerged in the mass media.

The official press dealt with the crises of July and August 1980 only after the events had become public knowledge. Although the official press began discussing the underlying problems which led to the strikes, it was not until July 16 that "work stoppages" began to be acknowledged in various local media in Poland. In the following week, the official media appeared to soften their stance towards the strikers, but press releases continued to emphasize the economic losses resulting from the strikes and to advise workers to return to their jobs. On July

---

[15] Solidarnosc, Issue 9 in Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Situation Report, Oct. 20, 1980, p. 24.

24, for example, a Polish Press Agency commentator emphasized that efficiency and discipline are the key to progress and stated that "surely disturbances in the everyday rhythm of work are not conducive to relieving our burdens."[16]

Although articles printed at the end of July and throughout August became increasingly concerned with workers' grievances, the official media continued to remind the strikers of Poland's economic problems and of their responsibility to work. A Trybuna Ludu article of August 4, "Poland's Chances Tied to Work," emphasizes that the stoppages will not solve the current economic problems. On August 13, Zycie Warszawy published a statement by a Warsaw Voivodship plenum which requested that workers return to their jobs. The statement maintained that some of the strikers' demands are justified, but that others are unrealistic.

Although strikes had afflicted Poland since July 2, it was not until August 14 that all the media publicly acknowledged the "work stoppages" taking place in Warsaw, Gdansk, and Lodz. On the following day, both Trybuna Ludu and Zycie Warszawy published commentaries on the "stoppages," which stressed that all points could be discussed, but that work could not be suspended.

At the heat of the crisis, the press addressed itself to workers' issues. Immediately thereafter, however, little mention was made of the events or of their implications. For example, Trybuna Ludu, the main Party daily, made no mention of

---

[16] Studium, October 1980, op. cit., p. 3.

the strikes for the first two weeks in August. In mid-August, news of the strikes such as the article of August 17[17] entitled "We Need Peace, and Above All Conscientiousness and Discipline in Daily Work" began appearing. The article stresses the need for peace, but makes no mention of the strikes in Gdansk.

The government's policies towards the striking workers demonstrated flexibility on certain issues, but held firm on others. At a press conference on August 17, Interpress Chief Wojciechowski said that the workers' demands for the right to strike and relaxation of censorship can be discussed, but that free trade unions or access to the media can not be discussed.[18] Similarly, Gierek delivered a speech on August 18 in which he acknowledged the justice of certain demands and agreed to certain concessions, but criticized the opposition. He expounded on measures to improve the standard of living, offered a broader share of participation in public life to the Polish people, and admitted that the official unions are too far from the workers. At the same time, however, he attacked "enemies of the people" and warned that challenges to the socialist state will not be tolerated.

Although the media continued to conduct an antistrike campaign and emphasize losses resulting from the strikes, from around August 20 until the signing of the agreement, the leadership desperately attempted to appease the strikers through statements in the press. The media used the word "strike" for

---

[17] Trybuna Ludu, August 17, 1980, p. 1.

[18] Studium, October 1980, op.cit., p. 5.

the first time in the press, radio, and television. On August 21, front page editorials discussed the role of the trade union bodies. On August 27, Jagielski himself spoke on television and delivered an open report on the Gdansk neotiations and the trade union issue. Trybuna Ludu printed an extensive comment by party publicist Ryszard Wojna on the possible outcomes of the negotiations. Wojna affirmed that the principles of popular self-government had sometimes been neglected in the past, and expressed the "party's readiness to resume dialogue with the working class on a number of demands, including political ones, even those which cannot be implemented immediately."[19] Wojna reiterated the government's position that the right to strike and the issue of censorship are negotiable, but warned that some demands affect the basic interests of the Polish state. These interests, he said, are defined by the alliance to which Poland belongs.

On August 28, the leadership issued strong warnings against division in the trade union movement and criticized the act of striking and the demand for free trade unions. Trybuna Ludu pointed out the dangers in splitting the trade union movement and argued that striking should be used only as a last resort. Zycie Warszawy reemphasized the need for peace and stability in Poland. Wojciechowski warned that continuing strikes could "provoke an abnormal situation"[20] and reported

---

[19]Ibid., p. 7.

[20]Wojciechowski in Studium, Ibid.

that no significant progress was in sight due to the unrealizable nature of the workers' demand for independent trade unions.

On August 29, the official media stepped up their attacks against "anti-socialist elements" and implicated KOR for stirring up workers in factories on the Baltic coast. Zycie Warszawy criticized KOR for allegedly exploiting the justified demands of workers for their own political purposes. Trybuna Ludu underscored the Polish state's commitment to its alliance with the Soviet Union. Szczecin party member Barcikowski maintained on Szczecin television that strikers, inspired by antisocialist elements, threaten Poland with moral decay and political disorder. He reminded his listeners that concessions have been made already, and called for a prompt end to the crisis.[21]

After the negotiations were successfully completed, the signing ceremony of the Gdansk agreement was shown on national television, and complete speeches of both Walesa and Jagielski were broadcast. Strike leader Walesa declared: "We have shown that Poles can always come to an agreement if they want to. It is a success for both sides.... We have achieved everything that was possible under the circumstances. The rest we will also achieve because we have what is most important: our independent self-governing trade unions. This is our guarantee for the future."[22] Jagielski affirmed: "We have spoken as Poles

---

[21] Studium, October 1980, op. cit., p. 7.

[22] Walesa in Studium, October 1980, op. cit. p. 8.

to Poles.... There are no winners and no losers. The important thing is that we have understood each other and the best guarantee for what we have done is hard work."[23]

In the days following the signing of the agreement, the major official papers, Trybuna Ludu, Zycie Warszawy, and Polityka underscored the wisdom of the Gdansk agreements. They continued, however, to criticize "antisocialist forces," a reference to KOR and other dissident organizations; to advertise the official unions and appeal for unity in the trade union movement; and to remind the Polish population of Poland's alliances in Eastern Europe. Since the signing of the Gdansk agreement, however, articles in the official papers exemplify a radical change in the press. They express the widespread dissatisfaction at the Party base. For example, immediately following the Ninth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, the Trybuna Ludu issues of March 30 and 31 contained pages of delegates' statements which were highly critical of the Party leadership.[24] Zycie Warszawy reacted to the recent Ninth Party Congress by praising the changes in the Party. The paper noted that for the first time it was not known ahead of time who would be elected. "And for the first time it is hard to say much about most of them except for this--they are new people."[25] Official press coverage of the 1980 labor strikes, negotiations, and agree-

---

[23]Jagielski in Studium, October 1980, Ibid.

[24]Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report, May 11, 1981, p. 1.

[25]Zycie Warszawy in New York Times, July 19, 1981, p. 4.

ments follows a cyclical pattern of little coverage to much coverage. This pattern developed as official journalists were forced at various junctures to react to public opinion. The unofficial journalists articulated grievances and helped to rally public support of the strikes. According to Tadeusz Walendowski, former editor of the underground quarterly Puls (Pulse),

> Perhaps never before had journalism played such an important part in effecting change. Not only had the opposition press managed to break the information blockade imposed by the government. It had also, and more importantly, assisted in the political education of both workers and intellectuals, teaching them what to expect and to hope for, and how to achieve it.[26]

This resulted in a constant, indirect interplay between the activities of the official journalists, and those of the unofficial journalists. Due in part to the success of the unofficial journalists, it became necessary for the government to respond through the official media to mounting pressure.

The official media coverage of political, social, and economic events in Poland reflects the factions and fights within the Party itself. Two trends have emerged: 1) A radical stance which criticizes the system; and 2) An official, conservative Party line. In the current press and media, articles representing opposite viewpoints can be found side-by-side.

Implications for the Future

In contrast to the crisis of June 1976, to which the government put an immediate end, the crisis of August 1980

---

[26]Tadeusz Walendowski, op. cit., p. 35.

could not be concluded without a much more exhaustive self-examination on the part of the government. The handling of the 1980 crisis by the mass media reflected the increasing extent to which the leadership was forced to come to terms with the growing leverage of the opposition.

The amount of time which elapsed during the crisis, and the level of organization of the opposition are determining factors in the differing responses of the media to the unrest and to the outcome of the unrest in 1976 and 1980. In 1976, the opposition press and communication networks were not substantial and well-enough developed to enable the opposition to react effectively and immediately to a crisis situation. In 1980, however, the opposition press was able to respond to the strikes through well-established communication networks constructed during the previous four years. The underground papers Komunikat and Biuletyn Informacyjny (associated with KOR) were founded in reaction to the official media's hard-line handling of the June strikes of 1976. The leadership's apparently successful attempt to strengthen its own position in 1976 served instead to strengthen the position of the opposition in subsequent years. The government's conservative policy in 1976 helped to provide the opposition with mechanisms for success in 1980.

Since the outbreaks of the strikes in July, the organization and internal cohesion of the party have been shaken. Although there have been attempts to arrest this process (through the removal of Gierek and other top leaders), a solid

basis for an evolution towards pluralism has been established. New groups are emerging as major forces in public life. Every sector of society is becoming involved in politics in a significant way. In effect, a process of bargaining has developed between newly empowered groups such as Solidarity, new factions within the Party, and officials of the old Party and Polish state.

In light of the new politicization of Polish society, the essential challenge for the government is to manage the new-found bargaining power and leverage of the workers while maintaining its position with Moscow. The government and the official press have suffered from a lack of credibility in the eyes of the populace. As the Chairman of the Department of Press, Radio, and Television of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee himself stated:

> a lot remains to be done in straight information, which is still bad. When the public fails to get honest information, it begins to suspect manipulation even where none exists; and the authorities must not show impatience with public mistrust, because they have too many sins on their conscience.[27]

Liberalization of the media is a major means through which the establishment of credibility can be accomplished and the leadership can better handle the politicization of Polish society.

In recent months, the issue of censorship has been widely discussed in public forums and in the press. One of the demands of Solidarity in the August negotiations was a

---

[27]Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report, 11 May 1981, p. 6.

new censorship law. Representatives to the Ninth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party held in July 1981 debated the proper role of the Party in the mass media and the Party's propaganda activities.

In its attempt to restore its credibility, the Party has allowed certain liberal changes in the official press since the signing of the Gdansk agreements. For example, Stefan Bratkowski, who was fired from his job as editor of Zycie Warszawy in 1963 when his articles became too critical of the government's policies, was rehired in the fall of 1980. In reference to his regained position, Bratkowski remarked:

> I think of it as a return to normalcy. ...This whole movement in Poland is one involving workers and thinking people. We must return to the normal functions of our profession--as a system for communication. The connections between the ruling groups and the society have been completely destroyed in this country. We shall try to reconstruct the system.[28]

At the Polish Journalist's Union (to which 90% of all journalists belong) Conference held in October, the journalists pledged to "earnestly and honestly report on the processes of democratization" going on in Poland and to aid in this endeavor as guardians of "an open society and free flow of information."[29] The publication of Solidarnosc without censorship and the printing of articles of non-traditional persuasion in the traditional press indicate that this process is taking hold.

---

[28]New York Times, November 10, 1980, p. A10.

[29]Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Situation Report, November 7, 1980, p. 7.

Not only has the Party relaxed its censorship rules, but it has allowed previously banned literature to be sold. For example, Polish authorities recently granted independent publisher Chojecki permission to exhibit the books of George Orwell, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and 1980 Nobel Prize winner Czeslaw Milosz, literature which had been banned in Poland until May 1981.[30] The loosening up of censorship and the mass media may well lay the groundwork for a major evolution of Polish politics within the Polish system of rule.

---

[30]San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 1981, p. 11.

HUNGARY

Introduction

Before his ouster from the Premiership in April 1955, Imre Nagy had been de-Stalinizing Hungary by conceiving of and instituting alternative political and economic policies within the existing framework of the Hungarian system. Nagy's reforms had been supported by a significant portion of the Communist Party and the majority of the population. Although Matyas Rakosi's return to power reversed Nagy's policies, it did not destroy knowledge of new possibilities.[31] Soviet Premier Khrushchev's refutation of Stalinist principles in his speech before the Twentieth Party Congress in December 1955 gave impetus to the supporters of Nagy.[32]

With the population in open revolt on October 23, Nagy was called out of retirement to lead the nation. On October 24, the Soviets intervened militarily. The first Soviet armed invasion united the overwhelming majority of Hungarians, including most Communists, in defense of the national rebirth. From October 24-November 3, Hungarians revolted against this domination, and on November 4, the Soviets intervened for the second time. Although the Soviets crushed the revolt, their

---

[31] Zbigniew K. Brezezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 210-211.

[32] Alex Nagy,"Hungarian Writers and the 1956 Revolution," Journalism Quarterly 49, 1972, p. 501.

presence strengthened opposition to the Kadar government and reinforced the national desire for an independent, democratic government.

Journalism Before and During the Revolt

Hungarian writers, both journalists and authors, were at the forefront of the reform movement in Hungary. They interpreted Khrushchev's speech "as a condemnation of Rakosi, a justification of Nagy, and a signal to move toward a more democratic way of life."[33] They intensified their struggle against censorship and spoke out in favor of democratic reforms.[34]

The movement by intellectuals and students to dismiss Rakosi and to institute economic and political reforms was endorsed by most of the official media, including Szabad Nep, the official Party newspaper. Szabad Nep, along with other Hungarian newspapers and the Hungarian News Agency, hailed the appearance of a new literary magazine Nagyvilag (The Wide World). Szabad Nep praised the magazine as an effective weapon against dogmatism and provincialism and as an instrument for the development of Hungarian national culture.[35] Shortly thereafter, the Cultural and Critics Branch of the Journalists Union adopted a resolution calling for a new press law which would guarantee immunity for reporters and full freedom of criticism in the press.

---

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., p. 502.

The official media expressed sympathy for the popular revolt. The following excerpt from the editorial "New Spring Parade," printed in the October 23, 1956 issue of Szabad Nep, articulates the media's sentiment towards it:

> MEETING follows upon meeting in our universities and our institutions of higher learning. Students of engineering, philosophy, law, and the creative arts are meeting at the universities of Budapest, Pecs, Szeged. These meetings of the youth are taking place in a passionate and stormy atmosphere, resembling a rampaging river overflowing its banks rather than an artificially channeled stream. Is this flood good? Is this fiery enthusiasm good? Let us admit that the past few years have made us forget about this sort of mass expression of opinion. Sectarianism and the Stalinist mistakes have dulled our sensitivity to mass opinion and mass movements which manifest themselves with elemental force, and even today there are those who cannot rid themselves of the old ingrained habits and regard these meetings of the youth with misgivings and distrust. Our Party and its press organ, Szabad Nep, align themselves with the youth, approve of these meetings, and wish these well-considered, creative discussions the best of success.
> ...
> There are people who seem to see a danger of bourgeois restoration in the heated debates of these meetings. These worries we feel have no serious foundation. Those who have attended these meetings have been able to hear and see that our university students have gone into battle not against but for the people's democratic system and for a purified socialism. In order to increase the effectiveness of this struggle and to further the realization of their aims, let us warn our young people to continue to be on their guard, as they have been up to now, lest counterrevolutionary manifestations be made at their meetings. Let them stand up, as they have stood up, against every kind of attempt at restoration.[36]
> ...

Although Szabad Nep and other official media shared the goals of the reformers, they did not openly encourage the revolt. According to Radio Budapest, the only official opera-

---

[36]Paul E. Zinner, National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 393 and 396.

ting medium of public information for about two days after the revolt began, several political groups demanded that Szabad Nep print a call for a general strike. "When the editorial staff refused, the insurgents stormed the building, tore up books and set them ablaze. Printers and journalists managed to prevent the revolutionaries from destroying the press, according to the broadcast."[37] Radio Budapest continued under Party control and proved to be a handicap to the rebels.

Since the official media did not enourage the revolt, the rebels printed their own newspapers. They utilized whatever press facilities to which they could gain access. The publishing situation was confused: some newspapers appeared and folded after the first press run; others frequently changed their editors. In contrast to the existence of five newspapers the previous year, from 17 to 25 daily newspapers appeared in the days following the outbreak of the revolt. These newspapers were immediately sold out.[38]

Szabad Nep took moderate positions, mediating between Moscow and the rebels. On October 29, Szabad Nep took issue with Pravda's interpretation of Hungarian events. The newspaper denounced the Pravda article, "The Collapse of the Anti-Popular Adventure in Hungary," as insulting and deploring.

> "Our most important fault," Szabad Nep declared, "was that we had not protected the sacred fire in-

---

[37] Nagy, op. cit., p. 502.

[38] Ibid.

> herited from our great ancestors: our national independence." Szabad Nep said Hungary must be free and independent. This is what Hungarians fought for and this is what they wanted, the newspaper stated. "This is what writers and journalists--fighting with their pens--want; this is what was demanded by the engineers, workers and peasants, by the demonstrating students, by the insurgents and by the Prime Minister."[39]

Several days before the Soviet military invasion, Premier Nagy attempted to restore calm and to avoid irritating the Soviets by banning the broadcasting and publishing of anti-Soviet statements and articles. He required all new papers to receive government authorization before beginning publication. The newspapers tamed their remarks as a result of his actions. Nevertheless, on Sunday, November 4, 1956, Soviet Army units moved into Hungary to crush the revolution.

Journalism After Soviet Intervention

Although such broadcasts were subsequently heard irregularly, November 9 was the last day of consecutive broadcasting by non-Soviet-controlled radio stations.[40] A Soviet-sponsored media accompanied the Soviet invasion. Soviet-controlled media, such as the following broadcast of November 4, appealed to the Hungarian population to support Soviet intervention.

> "Workers, peasants and intelligentsia! In...recent days it has become clear that the justified demands of workers, peasants, youth and intellectuals have been exaggerated by counterrevolutionary forces, and, taking advantage of our people's patriotism, they were launching an attack against the power of the working class. Comrades, workers, you know best what capitalist rule means, what unemployment, hunger

---

[39] Ibid., p. 503.

[40] East Europe, The Revolt in Hungary, Special Issue, December 1956.

> misery and humiliation mean. We believe that none of the workers want any of these things. Comrades, the attempt of the counterrevolutionaries has been defeated in the entire country and in our country also."[41]

After the revolt was put down, the Communist Party under the leadership of Kader set up a special commission to investigate the activities of journalists. As a result of this inquiry, approximately 400 journalists were fired from their jobs. In addition, about 25 of these journalists received jail sentences, and at least four were sentenced to death.[42]

Conclusion

Although the writers, both journalists and authors, did not intend to precipitate an open revolt, their works and their political involvements helped to bring about the revolt. The Journalist's Union, for example, passed a resolution which criticized censorship and called for democracy. "The evidence suggests conclusively that the concerted action and leadership of the writers helped create an atmosphere in Hungary which ultimately exploded into armed conflict with the Soviet Union."[43]

Not only did journalists play an important role in the intellectual preparation of the revolution, but they were influential during the uprising itself. The role of spokesmen was chosen for them, and they spoke not only for themselves, but

---

[41] Ibid., p. 89.

[42] Nagy, op. cit., p. 503.

[43] Ibid., p. 504.

for many segments of the population.[44] Some of the media defended the revolt and encouraged its participants. Other of the media, such as Party daily Szabad Nep, sympathized with the revolt but did not encourage opposition activities. Because the rebels lacked access to the official media, an opposition press appeared during the week of the revolt.

After the invasion, both the liberal activities of the opposition press and those of the official media were put down. Journalists who had supported the revolt were punished.

[44] Ibid.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Introduction

Like the reform movement in Hungary, the Czechoslovakian reform movement was rooted in the campaign of liberalization which began in the mid-1950s with the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's famous speech.[45] Despite this early precedent, the Czechoslovakian regime remained the "model satellite" of the Eastern bloc countries until 1963 when certain factions in the party succeeded in introducing economic reforms, and concomitantly, social and cultural changes.[46] The sentiment of "Prague Spring," the period of many progressive activities, was grounded in many winters of economic discontent.

> Stalinist methods of centralized planning, bureaucratic bottlenecks, forced investments in heavy industry, and especially a foreign trade crisis had resulted in an economic Depression. By August of that year, the third Five-Year Plan was abandoned. As the economy limped to a halt, the Novotny regime reluctantly agreed to extensive economic reforms.[47]

Although First Party Secretary Novotny succumbed to liberal pressures, it was under Dubcek, a moderate-liberal, that the economic reforms proceeded full scale and Prague Spring took place.

---

[45] Galia Golan, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era 1968-1969 (Cambridge, Mass.: The University Press, 1973), p.1.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Robin Allison Remington, ed., Winter in Prague (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 3.

The liberalization efforts of Party members and many other sectors of society culminated in a Soviet invasion on August 21, 1968. The Czechoslovakian leaders were called to Moscow to sign agreements. The post-invasion period was marked by successive crises which culminated in the removal of the reform leaders and the systematic destruction of their programs.[48]

Journalism Before and During the Liberalization

Although Czechoslovakia was faced with grave economic problems, it was not dissatisfied workers, but intellectuals who began the revolt. Writers were at the forefront of this movement.

> At the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers in June 1967, dissatisfaction with Novotny's token de-Stalinization and the party's rigid control of all cultural activity (increasingly insistent since 1963) became articulate criticism of the regime.[49]

In 1968, the mass media (radio and television in particular) sponsored open and critical discussions about political issues, and exposed past errors of the party. Whereas the professional journals of writers and journalists previously had spearheaded this process, in 1968, the vanguard shifted to the mass media.

> While there were reforms in the radio and television prior to 1968, these had been relatively limited and were insufficient to make of these media the progressive instruments those of the intellectuals had already become. After 1968, however, the matter became public, so to speak. Having won their struggle for the official adoption of their ideas (by their

---

[48]Golan, op. cit., p. 246.

[49]Remington, op. cit., p. 3.

> successful ascent to power), the Party reformers now sought to include the public in the struggle to implement and carry through the liberalization.[50]

Thus, in 1968, the mass media exploited the Party's cultural and information policy, and thereby became both representatives and leaders of the public.[51]

The new trends in the mass media gave rise to much controversy in the media on their role within the Party and their purpose in a socialist society. Rude Pravo, the Party daily, was critical of the liberalization of the press. On February 10, 1968, Rude Pravo printed an article which criticized the "mudslinging" and emphasis on past mistakes featured in the mass media.[52] In his speech to the May 29-June 1, 1968 central committee plenum, Dubcek analyzed the reasons for the wave of criticism of the media. He explained

> that the media did not realize the power they had to influence opinion--in this particular situation--against the Party. By the 'biased stressing of mistakes,' they had created a distrust and uncertainty among the public regarding Party policy, he explained. Failure of the media to respond quickly to 'anti-socialist' attacks from abroad was also a problem.53

Although the media went further than Dubcek and some of the other reformers wished, there is reason to believe that most of the reform leaders were committed to the principles outlined in the mass media.

---

[51] Golan, op. cit., p. 119.

[52] Ibid., p. 120.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., p. 124.

Journalism After Soviet Intervention

Like the invasion of Hungary, a Soviet-sponsored media accompanied the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovkia. Soviet-controlled broadcasts

> have included commentaries on traditional Soviet-Czechoslovakian friendship, on support for the military action in Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary as well as among Soviet citizens, and on the urgency of "defending socialism" against hostile forces. These broadcasts also decried attempts by "anti-socialist forces" to "provoke" the Czech people against the occupying troops and on the "fraternal" task of the Soviet soldiers.[54]

In contrast to Hungary, the national media of Czechoslovakia continued to be a powerful organizing force for several weeks after the invasion.

Although the Soviets had, within a few hours of their military intervention on August 21, occupied all strategic sites and abducted the major political figures, Czechoslovak radio and television remained on the air for days afterwards.[55]

> Keyed to the transmitters in Prague, Brno, and Bratislava, these stations gave the lie to Soviet claims that the Warsaw Pact powers had been invited into Czechoslovakia by representatives of the party and government. They also proved there had been no counterrevolutionary threat and they coordinated nationwide passive resistance to the invaders.[56]

Prague radio and television broadcast from improvised studios and borrowed transmitters throughout the country. The army and militia, training institutes, and factories provided radio facil-

---

[54] FBIS, August 28, 1968, p. 16.

[55] Slava Volny, The Saga of Czechoslovak Broadcasting, East Europe 17, No. 12, p. 10

[56] Ibid.

ties; citizens supplied food, protection, and transportation. During the first critical week of the occupation, radio and television directed the country by issuing instructions for citizens on avoiding provocations and arrest, securing food, travelling from place to place, and so forth. The media announced the one-hour strikes of Thursday, August 22 and Friday, August 23. They suggested that street names be changed and street numbers be eliminated in order to confuse the enemy. They urged the population to completely ignore the invaders. In contrast to the usual schedule of two radio programs and one television channel, five radio programs and three television channels operated during this first week.[57]

The press, too, continued to function for many days after the invasion, putting out newspapers and mimeographed bulletins. Here, too, the public and the military provided printing facilities and helped to distribute the papers. "There probably was not a journal, paper, organization or group that did not issue words of encouragement to the public, support for the legitimate leaders of the country, and condemnation of the invasion."[58]

The media responded pluralistically to the agreements signed by Dubcek in Moscow.

> While Czechoslovakian transmitters continue to carry numerous messages and commentaries asserting confidence in Dubcek and seconding his appeals for acceptance of the Moscow compromise, broadcasts since the 27th have aired popular reactions ranging from out-

---

[57]Golan, op. cit., p. 241.

[58]Ibid.

> right rejection of the Moscow agreements to resigned expressions of disappointment. Almost immediately after the release of the communique on the 27th, the radios carried resolutions purportedly emanating from such organizations as the city committees of Ostrava and Plzen, and including groups in state farms and factories, calling for rejection of the Moscow agreement and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces.[59]

Despite the initial adverse reaction of the Czechoslovkian press to the Soviet invasion, a normalization affected by the new requirements from Moscow soon emerged in the press.

> Josef Vohnout, head of the new Press and Information Office, in a telecast on 8 September described the censor as "a sort of essential intermediary link" between the government and the mass media--something on the order of a friendly watchdog who will conduct "running checks" and "retrospective evaluations" of the content of the press, broadcasts, and telecasts with the goal of "helping the normalization of the situation in our country to a maximum extent."[60]

It is within the confines of this arrangement that the Czechoslovak publicists subtly continued to agitate against the occupation.

Conclusion

Writers and journalists played a crucial role in the liberalization of Czechoslovakia prior to and during Prague Spring. The mass media not only reflected, but helped to shape the liberal views which flourished during Prague Spring. Dubcek and some of the other reformers believed that the press took the new liberalism too far. They criticized the negative and judgemental treatment of the Party by the media.

Throughout the first weeks of the intervention, the media provided an important information, advisory, and psychological

---

[59]FBIS, August 28, 1928, p. 15.

[60]FBIS, September 11, 1968, p. 10.

service for the population. Like in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia the new trends in the media were controversial and the media proved to be more liberal than some of the reformers wished. In contrast to Hungary, however, the official media in Czechoslovakia continued to be an important organizing force, even after Soviet intervention.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The strikes of 1976 in Poland gave rise to an active opposition press in Poland. The existence of communication networks and an established opposition press helped to enable the opposition to play an active role in forming public opinion during the strikes of 1980. In 1976, the Party leadership attempted to strengthen its own position by punishing the demonstrating workers; the official media responded to the strikes by towing a more conservative Party line. Instead of strengthening its own position, however, the leadership's handling of the strikes in 1976 helped to strengthen the position of the opposition. The leadership's policies served to fuel the opposition press and thereby provide the opposition with mechanisms for success in 1980.

The content, and with it, the role of the official media in Poland has been changing since the signing of the agreements in Gdansk. From that point on, a pluralistic approach to press coverage has emerged. Articles expressing opposite viewpoints appear side-by-side. Liberalization of the media is a means through which the Polish government is attempting to re-establish its credibility.

During the periods of liberalization in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, both official and unofficial journalists helped to shape the views of the opposition. In all three

countries, organized professional groups of journalists endorsed and actively participated in the liberalization movements. In all three countries, journalists cited economic reasons as the most crucial national obstacle. They agreed, however, that the economic problems could not be solved without concomitant social and political reforms, such as the loosening up of censorship regulations.

During the periods of liberalization, certain factions of the mass media acted as representatives and leaders of the reform movements. Certain trends in the media proved to be controversial, and certain factions went further than some of the reformers within the Party wished. When the mass media did not allow themselves to serve as vehicles of protest, the unofficial press appeared. During specific phases of liberalization and reform in all three countries, both the official and unofficial media were mobilized to fulfill important social and political functions. Although the movements towards liberalization in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia exhibit many similarities, there are some important differences. The Polish reform movement began at the grass-roots level and has far more grass-roots support than did the reform movements in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In contrast to the Communist Parties of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poland's Communist Party has acted generally as a moderating influence. In contrast to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poland has emerged as a pluralistic state in which power is dispersed among many groups, including the

church, trade unions, and various elements in the Party. In Poland, political and social struggles are being fought relatively openly and at all levels of society.

Poland's laissez faire communism is not likely to be crushed through Soviet military intervention. There are formidable deterrents to the use of tanks that did not exist in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. They consist of political, military, and economic considerations. In terms of relations with the West, the Soviets have far more to lose by cranking their tanks now than they did in 1956 or in 1968. With Afghanistan still a drain, a war in Poland would engage the Soviet Army on two fronts, and there is little doubt that at least factions of the Polish Army would fight a Soviet military intervention. Soviet intervention would also entail substantial economic drawbacks. The Soviet Union could allow Poland to default on her $27 billion debt to the West, but would eventually have to assume Poland's economic burdens and help to relaunch Polish production.

A revolution has occurred in Poland. The recent Ninth Party Congress in Warsaw is certain to have far-reaching consequences not only in Poland, but ultimately throughout the Soviet bloc. The mass media will undoubtedly play a role in shaping societies which will be more pluralistic in nature. And since the liberalization of the mass media not only affects political outcomes, but also results from them, the mass media are likely to be substantially trans-

formed through political and social repercussions in the Eastern bloc countries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary

BIELASIAK, JACEK
1980 Polish Politics: The Permanence of Crisis. (Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-30, 1980).

BIULETYN INFORMACYJNY
1979 (Komunikat KSS "KOR") Nr. 2; (Luty-Marzec)

1979 (Komunikat KSS "KOR") Nr. 4; (Maj-Czerwiec)

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
July 10, 1981
July 13, 1981
July 21, 1981

CZERWINSKI, E.J. and PIEKALKIEWICZ, JAROSLAW (Eds.)
1972 The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe. New York, Praeger Publishers.

FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service)
TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA (CONTENTS)

1968	Aug. 14	Aug. 28	Sept. 11	Sept. 25	
	Aug. 21	Sept. 5	Sept. 18		
1981	Apr. 3	Apr. 10	Apr. 20	June 2	June 29
	Apr. 7	Apr. 16	Apr. 21	June 11	
	Apr. 8	Apr. 17	Apr. 29	June 17	

GOLAN, GALIA
1973 Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era 1968-1969. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The University Press.

HAMPSHIRE, STUART and BIOM-COOPER, LOUIS
1977 Index on Censorship 6.

HAMSIK, DUSAN
1971 Writers Against Rulers. Great Britain: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

HANDBUCK DER WELTPRESSE
1970 (Band 1: Die Pressesysteme der Welt). Köln und Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag.

1970 (Band 2: Weltkatalog der Zeitungen). Köln und Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag.

KAPLAN, FRANK L.
The Communist International's Press Control from Moscow. Journalism Quarterly 48, pp. 315-25.

KARPINSKI, JAKUB
1979 More than Dissidents. Index on Censorship 6.

KRUCZEK, ADAM
1970 "Samizdat." Kultura. March 1970, p. 62-65.

KURON, JACEK and MODZELEWSKI
1966 Monopolsozialismus. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag.

MICHNIK, ADAM
1976 The New Evolutionism. Survey. Vol. 22, no. 3/4.

MOND, GEORGE and RICHTER, R.
"Writers and Journalists: A Pressure Group in East European Politics." Journalism Quarterly 43, p.95-106.

NAGY, ALEX
1972 Hungarian Writers and the 1956 Revolution. Journalism Quarterly 49, pp. 498-504.

NEW YORK TIMES
July 18, 1981
July 19, 1981
July 21, 1981

PELIKAN, JIRI
1976 Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe in the Czechoslovak Example. London, Allison & Busby.

PSZENICKI, CHRIS
1979 The Flying University. Index on Censorship 6.

RADIO FREE EUROPE RESEARCH
1976 Background Report (Poland) May 14, Vol. 106.

1976 Polish Situation Report, July 7, Vol. 22.

1976 Polish Situation Report, July 23, Vol. 25.

1976 Background Report (Poland) August 5, Vol. 171.

1976 Polish Situation Report, August 6, Vol. 26.

1976 Polish Situation Report, August 13, Vol. 27.

1976 Background Report (Poland) August 16, Vol. 176.

1976 Background Report (Poland) October 5, Vol. 207.

1976 Polish Situation Report, October 8, Vol. 34.

1976 Polish Situation Report, October 29, Vol. 36.

1976 Polish Situation Report, November 29, Vol. 40.

1976 Polish Situation Report, December 3, Vol. 41.

1976 Polish Situation Report, December 10, Vol. 42.

1976 Polish Situation Report, December 17, Vol. 43.

1977 Polish Situation Report, January 14, Vol. 1.

1977 Polish Situation Report, February 1, Vol. 3.

1977 Polish Situation Report, February 4, Vol. 4.

1977 Polish Situation Report, February 18, Vol. 5.

1977 Polish Situation Report, March 16, Vol. 8.

1977 Polish Situation Report, April 29, Vol. 11.

1977 Background Report (Poland) June 30, Vol. 132.

1977 Background Report (Poland) July 26, Vol. 151.

1977 Polish Situation Report, May 11, Vol. 12.

1977 Polish Situation Report, May 20, Vol. 13.

1977 Polish Situation Report, May 27, Vol. 14.

1977 Polish Situation Report, June 7, Vol. 15.

1977 Polish Situation Report, June 15, Vol. 16.

1977 Polish Situation Report, July 11, Vol. 18.

1977 Polish Situation Report, August 1, Vol. 20.

1977 Background Report (Poland) August 9, Vol. 160.

1977 Polish Situation Report, August 16, Vol. 21.

1977 Polish Situation Report, August 30, Vol. 22.

1977 Polish Situation Report, September 16, Vol. 23.

1977 Background Report (Poland) September 23, Vol. 192.

1977 Background Report (Poland) September 27, Vol. 194.

1977 Polish Situation Report, October 13, Vol. 25.

1977 Polish Situation Report, October 24, Vol. 26.

1977 Polish Situation Report, December 2, Vol. 28.

1977 Background Report (Poland) December 23, Vol. 255.

1978 Polish Situation Report, January 13, Vol. 1.

1978 Background Report (Poland) February 9, Vol. 28.

1978 Polish Situation Report, March 3, Vol. 6.

1978 Background Report (Poland) March 16, Vol. 51.

1978 Polish Situation Report, March 17, Vol. 7.

1978 Background Report (Poland) May 26, Vol. 101.

1978 Polish Situation Report, May 30, Vol. 12.

1978 Background Report (Poland) July 6, Vol. 152.

1978 Polish Situation Report, July 11, Vol. 16.

1978 Situation Report, July 16, Vol. 16.

1978 Polish Situation Report, September 8, Vol. 21.

1978 Polish Situation Report, September 25, Vol. 22.

1978 Background Report (Poland) September 26, Vol. 210.

1978 Background Report (Poland) October 24, Vol. 231.

1978 Background Report (Poland) October 31, Vol. 236.

1978 Polish Situation Report, November 27, Vol. 27.

1980 Polish Situation Report, February 6, Vol. 4.

1980 Background Report (Poland) March 11, Vol. 58.

1980 Background Report (Poland) April 22, Vol. 88.

1980 Polish Situation Report, May 9, Vol. 10.

1980 Polish Situation Report, June 24, Vol. 13.

1980 Background Report (Poland) July 16, Vol. 172.

1980 Background Report (Poland) July 21, Vol. 181.

1980 Background Report (Poland) July 25, Vol. 188.

1980 Polish Situation Report, August 5, Vol. 16.

1980 Background Report (Poland) August 26, Vol. 213.

1980 Background Report (Poland) September 5, Vol. 217.

1980 Background Report (Poland) September 17, Vol. 222.

1980 Polish Situation Report, September 19, Vol. 17.

1980 Background Report (Poland) October 2, Vol. 237.

1980 Polish Situation Report, October 3, Vol. 18.

1980 Background Report (Poland) October 6, Vol. 233.

1980 Background Report (Poland) October 10, Vol. 241.

1980 Polish Situation Report, October 20, Vol. 19.

1980 Background Report (Poland) October 30, Vol 262.

1980 Background Report (Poland) October 30, Vol. 261.

1980 Polish Situation Report, November 7, Vol. 20.

1980 Background Report (Poland) November 10, Vol 266.

1981 Background Report (Poland) January 26

1981 Background Report (Poland) March 31

1981 Background Report (Poland) April 7

1981 Background Report (Poland) April 9

1981 Background Report (Poland) April 13

1981 Background Report (Poland) May 11

1981 Situation Report, May 14

1981 Situation Report, May 29

RFE-RL (Radio Liberty Research)

April 16, 1981

June 5, 1981

REMINGTON, ROBIN ALLISON (Ed.)
1969 Winter in Prague. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M.I.T. Press.

SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
May 11, 1981

SAWYER, CHARLES
1980 Beating the Censor. New York Times Book Review, (October 5, 1980).

SCHWARTZ, HARRY
1969 Prague's 200 Days. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.

SLAVA VOLNY
The Saga of Czechoslovak Broadcasting. East Europe 17, No. 12, pp. 10-15.

STUDIUM.
1976 Actions in Defense of Polish Workers. (Vol. 1; Dec. 1976; No. 1).

1977 Student's Death Triggers Mass Protest Leading to New Arrests. (Vol. 1; June 1977; No. 3).

1977 Concern for Human Rights Leads to Amnesty. (Vol. 1; Sept. 1977; No. 4).

1980 Trial of Independent Publishers in Poland Evokes Western Reaction. (Vol. 4; July 1980; No. 3).

1980 Danger Ahead? Poland's Crisis Not Over. (Vol. 4; Oct. 1980; No. 4).

SZAFAR, TADEUSZ
1979 The Political Opposition in Poland. The Polish Review. Vol. XXIV, No. 1.

SZCZYPIORSKI, ANDRZEJ
1979 Poland--The fiction and the reality. Index on Censorship 6.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
1980 Polish Journalists Move to Salvage Their Reputation. Nov. 10, 1980.

TRYBUNA LUDU
1980 (All daily issues Aug. 31 - Nov. 28)

TUCHANSKA, BARBARA
1973 Socjologia w Prasie Polskeij w Latach 1956-1970. Studia Socjologiczna 49, No. 2, p. 227-238.

WALC, JAN
1979 Unofficial Publishing. Index on Censorship 6.

WALENDOWSKI, TADEUSZ
1980 The Polish Summer of 1980. Columbia Journalism Review (Nov./Dec.)

1980 The Polish Workers Gain Maturity. The New York Times, August 20, 1980.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
May 28, 1981
July 16, 1981

Secondary

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW K.
1967 The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.

BROMKE, ADAM
1976 "A New Juncture in Poland." Problems of Communism 25, No. 5.

1978 "The Opposition in Poland." Problems of Communism 28, No. 5, pp. 37-51.

1978 "Poland at the Crossroads," World Today. April 1978.

BUZEK, ANTHONY
1964 How the Communist Press Works. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.

CONNOR, WALTER D.
1980 "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" Problems of Communism 24, (Jan.-Feb. 1980), pp. 1-17.

FEUERREISEN, FRITZ
1971 Die Presse in Europa. Munchen-Pullach, Verlag Dokumentation.

HELSINKI WATCH
1980 The Polish Workers' Movement and Human Rights, (U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee).

KATALOG PRASY POLSKIEJ
1963 (Warsaw: Biuro Wydawnicze "Ruch," 1963).

LOS ANGELES TIMES
April 18, 1979

POLAND: A HANDBOOK
1977 Warsaw: Interpress Publishers.

ROCZNIK STATYSTYCZNY 1977
1977 Warszawa: Ministerstwo Oswiaty i Wychowania, 1977.

RUPNIK, JACQUES
1979 Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: The end of revisionism and the rebirth of the civil society. In Rudolf L. Tokes, Opposition in Eastern Europe. (Hopkins)

SICINSKI, ANDRZEJ
Television and Radio in the Structure of Material and Cultural Needs of the Polish Society. Polish Sociological Bulletin 2, pp. 124-34.

SIMON, MAURICE D.
1980 A Window on Poland's Social Transformation. Problems of Communism 24, No. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1980).

SMITH, REED M.
1980 "Content Analysis of the Polish Press." (Paper presented at the Midwest Slavic Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio: May 2, 1980).

TOMA, PETER A.
1970 The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe. Arizona, The University of Arizona Press.

ZINNER, PAUL E. (Ed.)
1956 National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe. New York, Columbia University Press.